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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION
Stephen R. Palmquist

This article extends the metaphorical trial posed by the authors of In Defense
of Kant’s Religion by cross-examining them with two challenges. The first
challenge is for the authors to clarify their claim that they are the first interpreters to present “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that
portrays it as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts,
given that several of the past interpreters whose works they survey in Part 1
conduct a similar type of analysis. The second is to compare the assumption
pervading Part 2 of their book, that Kant conducts his first “experiment”
in the first three Pieces and the second experiment in the Fourth Piece of
Religion, with the previously defended view that the two experiments are
weaved throughout all four Pieces. After observing several dangers this assumption poses for affirmative interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion,
I conclude by showing how the authors’ problem-driven hermeneutic led
them to downplay various portions of Kant’s text.

Extending the Trial
I cannot hide my sympathy with the overall thrust of In Defense of Kant’s
Religion (IDKR). Its masterful effort to resolve “the most common conundrums forwarded by Kant’s critics” (234)1 resonates so extensively with my
own reading of Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason that I would
be foolish to minimize its significance. Nevertheless, merely singing the
praises of its contribution to the recent “affirmative” trend in interpreting Kant’s great (but hardly straightforward) philosophical classic would
waste a valuable opportunity to advance the cutting edge of scholarship.
Bypassing the statutory praises one gives at the outset of such critical
reviews (but see note 15, below), I shall therefore move directly to the first
of two questions, intended here to cross-examine the authors’ defense of
Kant’s coherence.
In keeping with IDKR’s two-part division—first an overview of past
interpreters’ positions, then a fresh attempt to interpret Religion, based on
three novel interpretive assumptions—I begin by asking for clarification
on how the authors understand their claims to IDKR’s uniqueness. My
1
Page references without other identifiers refer to Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs,
In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
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second question, stemming from IDKR’s Part 2, focuses on the legitimacy
of one of its three interpretive innovations. I aim to offer the authors an
opportunity to clarify where they stand on two issues that might otherwise prevent readers from accurately assessing the nature and extent of
their accomplishment.
Kant’s Religion as a Transcendental System
My first question is: What do you mean by your claim that IDKR uniquely
presents “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that portrays it
as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts?2 IDKR clearly
does conduct such an analysis. What is puzzling is that the authors seem
unaware that books in their own Bibliography have also done so. Given
that Part 1 shows an impressive command of recent major trends in interpreting Religion, the authors must not intend the quoted words in their
ordinary sense. Hermeneutic charity constrains one to assume they are
aware that some of the very interpreters whose works they summarize
have written section-by-section commentaries portraying Religion as defending a transcendental system. Unless the authors were either unaware
of this or chose to ignore such previous attempts (neither assumption being
charitable), they must have meant something idiosyncratic by “linear
interpretation” and “transcendental analysis.”
If the authors insist they are using these terms in their normal sense,
my first question would be a request that the authors clarify why they
failed to acknowledge that their approach in Part 2 follows an already
established motif. Not in dispute is that IDKR uniquely responds to the
challenges of certain specific allegations against the coherence of Kant’s system. But Part 2 claims to accomplish far more than this, as if there simply
are no precursors to their linear, transcendental analysis. Thus, this first
challenge appears to be stronger: to explain how their understanding of a
linear transcendental analysis differs fundamentally from past interpreters’ understanding of these terms. Several examples that appear to contradict their claim will highlight the urgency of this challenge.
Allen Wood, the past defender of Kant’s coherence with whom IDKR
interacts most often in Part 2, initiated the affirmative shift in interpreting Kant’s Religion, though he did not traverse very far down the path he
forged. While much of his Kant’s Moral Religion examines religious implications of theories advanced in Kant’s Critiques, three chapters discuss
Kant’s Religion. Wood presents a text-based analysis of the key arguments
in the First and Second Pieces.3 His analysis is linear, though not holistic,
since he offers only cursory comments on the Third and Fourth Pieces.
IDKR 233; cf. 154 and throughout Part 2.
In referring to the four “Books” of Religion, I follow Werner Pluhar’s recent translation of Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), calling
each Book a “Piece”—this being the literal translation of Kant’s term, Stück. Kant probably
used this term because he initially wrote these four essays as “pieces” for publication in
Berlinische Monatsschrift.
2
3

172

Faith and Philosophy

Moreover, although the early Wood’s preferred motif is quasi-existentialist,
he focuses on the role of the disposition as Kant’s key to establishing a
non-empirical account of conversion, thus highlighting that Kant’s analysis
is transcendental.4 It is odd that the authors chose Wood’s linear transcendental analysis and his account of the centrality of the disposition as
their primary partner in dialogue: Wood could not have responded to the
“conundrums” IDKR attempts to resolve, because they were all advanced
after Wood wrote his book!
Without mentioning each Kant-interpreter featured in IDKR, we can
assume at least some would regard their books as having progressed
further than Wood in making Kant’s Religion coherent. Would John
Hare, for example, accept the claim that his Kant’s Moral Gap contains no
linear, transcendental analysis of Religion? IDKR defines “linear interpretation” as “one where [the text’s] arguments are understood to build
on one another by unpacking underdeveloped concepts from [Kant’s]
critical philosophy in ways that are intricate and insightful” (233). Do
the authors seriously deny that some past interpreters of Religion have
done exactly that?
Consider Sidney Axinn’s The Logic of Hope. IDKR lists this book in the
Bibliography (262) and refers to it once (257), yet never points out that
Axinn’s Chapter 3 is a lengthy, section-by-section analysis of Religion,
explicitly aiming to establish the text’s holistic coherence.5 Axinn conducts
a rigorous logical analysis of the arguments that appear problematic, given
Kant’s strictures on knowledge—this being the precise nature of the
alleged conundrums IDKR defends Kant against. IDKR never considers
the position Axinn defends, that Religion might be inherently ambiguous
because human persons are inherently ambiguous, so that Kant’s portrayal
of religion is both accurate and deep precisely because of the (apparent)
conundrums IDKR claims to dispel. Like Axinn, other past interpreters
think Kant’s emphasis on hope is rooted in his unwillingness to take refuge
in the kind of metaphysical “cognitions” the authors claim Kant establishes
in Religion. Curiously (given the in-depth literature review in Part 1),
IDKR offers no example of an Axinn-type affirmative approach.
In case I am misunderstanding other interpreters’ positions, this first
line of questioning concludes by referring to my own publications on
Religion. My first conversation with one of IDKR’s authors was sparked
by his interest in my then-recent (1992) Kant-Studien article, “Does Kant
Reduce Religion to Morality?” That article offers a resounding “No” to
its title’s question, suggesting we should instead read Religion as raising
morality to the level of religion. In defending this position, I present a
linear summary of Kant’s entire argument, portraying Religion as a system of transcendental conditions for the possibility of religion. That essay
appears (revised) as Chapter VI of Kant’s Critical Religion (KCR), where it
4
5

Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell, 1970), 180, 203, 230.
Sidney Axinn, The Logic of Hope (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994), 67–138.
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prepares for Part Three’s tracing of Kant’s systematic argument through
every section of Religion;6 Chapter VII analyzes Kant’s “attempt” (Versuch) to
construct a system of rational religion (his so-called “first experiment”7);
Chapter VIII analyzes his “attempt” to render Christianity consistent with
that system (his second experiment); Chapter IX adopts the opposing, biblical theologian’s Perspective, outlining a Christian theology that remains
Kantian. KCR’s threefold analysis covers every major aspect of Kant’s text
discussed by IDKR, including the transcendental character of the “archetype” (or prototype) as a metaphysical “gift” without which “conversion
would be impossible” (KCR, 162). Yet IDKR virtually ignores KCR’s Part
Three. The only hint that these lengthy chapters exist comes in Part 1: “To
unpack all the idiosyncrasies of Palmquist’s approach to Religion [i.e., of
KCR’s Part Three] would take us well beyond the confines of the required
testimony” (24). IDKR’s summary of KCR’s position focuses instead on
KCR’s claims about the metaphysical grounding of Kant’s Critical philosophy in the mystical writings of Swedenborg; to make this point, the authors admittedly need not summarize KCR’s analysis of the coherence of
Kant’s Religion as a transcendental system. In the context of the courtroom
metaphor adopted in IDKR’s Part 1, this neglect of KCR’s interpretive
heart may be legitimate. But is it legitimate to go on in Part 2 to defend
an interpretation of Religion that closely resembles and was directly
influenced by KCR’s, without ever acknowledging the similarity?8 Only if
the authors meant something idiosyncratic by “holistic and linear” and
“transcendental analysis.”
IDKR exhibits several worrying indications that this charitable reading may be unwarranted. Part 1 presents KCR’s Kant as an outright mystic,
missing the point of the qualifier “Critical” in “Critical mysticism.” KCR
never portrays Religion as an explicit defense of any kind of mysticism (not
even “Critical”). Quite to the contrary, “Critical” mysticism means (in part)
that the Critical System provides a philosophical grounding for a properly
mystical life, in contrast to Swedenborg’s fanatical mysticism. When Kant
6
Stephen Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). KCR applies the systematic assumptions introduced in volume
one (KSP), Kant’s System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1993). These assumptions form a backdrop but are
not the focus of KCR’s Part Three, whose exposition is an explicitly transcendental interpretation of Religion (see KCR, 142 and passim). Our authors apparently mistook the backdrop
inherited from Volume One (i.e., the “architectonic”) to be the purpose of KCR.
7
Pluhar is the only English translator who consistently uses “experiment(s)” for both of
Kant’s initial references to these two “attempts” (Versuche) in Religion 12.
8
In presenting the Palmquist-Wood contrast (103–104), IDKR never acknowledges KCR’s
basic claim, that Religion bridges Kant’s theoretical and practical systems. IDKR adopts the
term coined in KSP, “judicial standpoint” (see e.g., KSP, 62, 355–356), to describe the synthetic role Religion plays in Kant’s architectonic; yet IDKR, not acknowledging this as KCR’s
position, falsely portrays KCR’s interpretation of Religion as appealing to the symbolic mystery of mystical irrationality! For a good illustration of the cognitive content conveyed by
Kantian symbolism, on my view, see the interpretation of the archetype/prototype in KCR
161–163, 207–216, and further development of that position in my essay “Could Kant’s Jesus
Be God?,” International Philosophical Quarterly 52:4 (forthcoming, December 2012).
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wrote Religion he had completed his Critical groundwork for metaphysics,
and so also his implicitly analogous Critical groundwork for mysticism.
Religion is therefore no more a defense of mysticism than a defense of metaphysics as such. Moreover, IDKR’s Part 2 portrays KCR’s approach even more
inaccurately: each of the authors’ several references is either confusing or
commits outright exegetical error.9
Rather than acknowledging its relevance, IDKR misleadingly labels
KCR as defending the “Religion-as-Symbol thesis” (209). One aspect of
KCR’s interpretation of Religion could be called a “Faith-as-Symbol thesis”;
but this is very different. Religion, on my reading of Kant, puts believers
in touch with an inner, transcendental reality that concrete symbols of
faith must point to in order to retain meaningfulness; but religion cannot
be reduced to these symbols! IDKR is completely correct to advance this
claim (209), except insofar as to imply no previous interpreter has made
it. Ironically, the authors note that Kant “admits” the importance symbols have in religion, portraying this as “akin to the Religion-as-Symbol
motif of Ward and Palmquist” (229). Nowhere do I identify Kantian religion with symbolism;10 yet IDKR latches onto one word, “symbolically”
(177–178), to discount KCR’s reading of Kantian atonement, even though
KCR also defends a much deeper, non-symbolic interpretation,11 similar
to the one advanced in IDKR. KCR not only agrees with, but directly
influenced IDKR’s claim that Kant’s first experiment in Religion is essentially a system of the transcendental conditions that make the symbols
of empirical religion theoretically possible and morally necessary (e.g.,
KCR 148–149).
IDKR contrasts its heretofore allegedly “untried” approach to those of
past interpreters with bold words like: “Gone was the temptation to truncate the text in order for it to make sense” (234). Yet some past interpreters
have conducted the kind of holistic analysis IDKR claims to perform; not
all “truncate the text.” Ironically, the authors’ implied self-assessment,
that their interpretation does not truncate Kant’s text, turns out to be
questionable.
Locating Kant’s Two “Experiments”
The novel assumption that most seriously undermines the overall cogency
of IDKR’s interpretation concerns how to identify Kant’s two “experiments.”
9
See e.g., IDKR, 210 n1. Part 2 criticizes several passages (e.g., 154, 167) that are quoted
from KCR completely out of context (cf. KCR, 211, 282); taken in its proper context, each passage actually agrees with IDKR’s position!
10
In The Tree of Philosophy: A Course of Introductory Lectures for Beginning Students of Philosophy (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 2000), I do discuss Paul Tillich’s explicit identification
of symbolism and religion in Lecture 31, just before presenting a holistic, linear summary
of Kant’s transcendental theory of religion in Lectures 32 and 33. Perhaps this order of exposition misled the authors into thinking that on my view Kant also adopts their so-called
“Religion-as-Symbol” motif.
11
See KCR, 165, 210, 215–216, 458–464. The latter passage consists of an entire section,
entitled “Critical Soteriology and the Problem of Atonement for Sins.”
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The other two assumptions—that Kant’s distinction between pure cognition
and empirical cognition helps overcome his strictures on God-talk, and that
“disposition” for Kant refers to “the enduring moral ontology of the human
being” (122)—are also controversial. But this third assumption is the most
subtle and problematic. So my second question is: How do you reconcile your
claims about the location of Kant’s two experiments with the massive amount of contrary evidence in Kant’s text?
IDKR’s assumption here is indeed novel: that when Kant distinguishes
between two experiments in the Prefaces, he intends to develop the first
experiment entirely in the first three Pieces, modulating to the second
experiment only in the Fourth Piece. Unfortunately, the authors make
little effort to rebut previously published evidence contradicting their
position. They merely assert: “Kant’s explication of rational religion in the
first experiment refers specifically to Books One, Two, and Three” (203).
Yet Kant makes no such claim. Without any significant textual backing,12
their assertion amounts to intriguing eisegesis.
The authors’ assumption is instructive, though mistaken. In describing
Kant’s account of the two experiments, they claim the first “considers only
natural religion,” while the second relates natural religion to a specific
revelation (114); yet Kant introduces “natural religion” only in the Fourth
Piece, never mentioning it in the Prefaces. By assuming the first experiment corresponds to what Kant later calls “natural religion,” they cleverly
make their assumption appear self-evident: the Fourth Piece, being the
only place where Religion discusses how natural religion as such relates
to a purported revelation, must constitute the second experiment! This is
not merely a verbal quibble; it has far-reaching implications for how we
understand the two experiments and the overall goal of Religion.
Two problems plague IDKR’s assumption. First, it leaves unexplained
why Kant examines scriptural claims to revelation not only in the Fourth
Piece, but throughout Religion. He compares Scriptural claims to rational
doctrines in each Piece, discussing in each case whether the doctrine
“lead[s] back to the same pure rational system of religion”—this being
Kant’s description of how the first experiment (the “pure rational system”)
relates to the second (Religion, 12). The section-by-section exegesis in KCR’s
Chapter VIII carefully analyses how the whole Religion text weaves the
two experiments together like two sides of a tapestry, so that characteristics of both experiments are visible in each Piece. The details presented
in KCR demonstrate what I can only summarize here: the second experiment comes into focus toward the end of each Piece. Thus, the last section
of the First Piece (necessarily downplayed in IDKR) explicitly modulates
to an examination of the Christian doctrine of original sin, highlighting its origin in “Scripture” (Religion, 41); KCR 202–207 interprets this as
12
Our authors claim the word “test” (Religion, 156) signals this modulation; yet Kant’s
word, prüfen, carries a distinctive meaning that is irrelevant to the two experiments: “Versuch” (see note 7, above) never occurs in this allegedly crucial passage.
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Kant’s crucial first stage “[i]n carrying out his second experiment” (KCR,
202). Similarly, in the Second Piece, Section Two begins “Holy Scripture
. . . sets forth this intelligible moral relation in the form of a story” (Religion, 78), then compares the scriptural account of salvation with the
rational account Kant himself defended in Section One; significantly,
instead of responding to the explicit claim in KCR 165, 207–216, that Kant
is here developing an important “second stage” in his second experiment,
IDKR mentions Section Two only once, incorrectly identifying it as part
of the General Comment (166; cf. 155). The Third Piece, likewise, has two
major “Divisions”: Division One, a “Philosophical Presentation” (Religion,
95), focuses on the first experiment (KCR, 165–175), while Division Two’s
“Historical Presentation” (Religion, 124) focuses on the second experiment
(KCR, 216–229). IDKR goes to great lengths to rationalize why Division
Two says so much about Christianity (185), something the authors think
Kant should have put in the Fourth Piece (e.g., 192). What is puzzling here
is not that IDKR proposes a new suggestion regarding the location of the
two experiments, but that in spite of their masterful overview of the literature in Part 1, the authors miss a golden opportunity to defend their novel
assumption, had they argued against the alternative defended at length
in KCR. Instead of taking up that challenge in IDKR, the authors simply
remain silent about what is arguably the most detailed, textually-based
alternative reading in the literature.13
The second (and arguably more serious) problem posed by the authors’
assumption about the location of the two experiments is that their account
implies the arguments of the Fourth Piece play no formal role in Kant’s system
of rational religion (i.e., in the first experiment). Ironically, their summary
of the purpose of the Fourth Piece implies its sole task cannot be to conduct the second experiment. Because in the Third Piece Kant has argued
that the weakness of human nature requires empirical manifestations
of the invisible church (and because we humans must be in charge of
organizing these structures), Kant emphasizes in the Fourth Piece the importance of keeping such empirical structures well “pruned” (228). If the
authors’ assumption were correct, then this metaphorical pruning would
apply only to Christian churches, not to the practice of rational religion
as such or to manifestations of other historical faiths. Interestingly, the
authors inadvertently imply that Kant is here also thinking of the first
13
While KCR’s Chapter VII presents itself as a thoroughgoing attempt to trace Kant’s
first experiment through the entire text of Religion, by contrast, Chapter VIII explicitly aims
to focus on an “examination of Kant’s second experiment” (KCR, 196). That discerning the
precise locations of the two experiments is one of the main topics of these two chapters of
KCR is evidenced by the fact that the word “experiment” occurs twenty times in the former
chapter and twenty-six times in the latter chapter. A summary of my position on “Kant’s
second experiment” is presented at KCR, 201–202: “Books One and Two correspond . . . to
the Old and New Testament, respectively. Books Three and Four likewise correspond to
early church history and traditional forms of Christian worship.” When I discussed this
interpretation of the two experiments with one of the authors at length in 2004, while working together on a co-edited book, he assured me that his lack of a persuasive response
would be fully rectified in IDKR.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION

177

experiment, for they refer to “the dual perspective of the two experiments” (228); even while discussing Christianity in the Fourth Piece, Kant
also says something essential about the first experiment. As KCR’s linear
analysis demonstrates, one side of the tapestry cannot be woven without
threads appearing on the other side!
If the Fourth Piece consists entirely and only of Kant’s second experiment
(210), then the distinction between true and false service of God, made in its
title, would apply only to Christians. This distinction plays an indispensable (though regulative, hypothetical) role in completing Kant’s system of
rational religion (see KCR, 229–235), yet IDKR’s assumption regarding the
purpose of the Fourth Piece forces the authors to ignore this role. If their
novel assumption were correct, then wouldn’t Kant’s title indicate his intent
to modulate to his long-awaited consideration of Christianity? IDKR never
addresses the obvious problem of why Kant avoids mentioning Christianity in the title of the Fourth Piece, if conducting the second experiment is
actually its sole purpose.
IDKR’s account of “the opening of Book Four” (211) is technically correct, but misleading, because it does not describe all that Kant accomplishes there. Readers unfamiliar with Religion would not know, merely
from reading IDKR, that (following a summary of the first-experiment
argument up to this point) this opening section explains the key rational
distinction between true and false service of God. To persuade their readers that the Fourth Piece makes no contribution to the first experiment,
the authors must downplay this distinction, since it is a crucial component
of Kant’s system of rational religion. Even though Kant emphasizes this
focus both in the title of the Fourth Piece and in its opening section, IDKR
discusses Kant’s theory of true and false service only nineteen pages into
chapter 8 (227)—just five pages before the end.
IDKR points out that the Fourth Piece is divided into sections considering natural religion and revealed religion. The authors’ discussion of
these terms is accurate (219–220), though incomplete; it does not justify
the conclusion drawn from it regarding the location of the second experiment. Because Kant associates both sections with Christianity, the
authors assume both must refer to the second experiment. But the first
section explicitly argues that Christianity at its core is a natural religion;
as the authors admit, the latter is the topic of the first experiment. Kant’s
distinction between natural and learned religion correlates more unambiguously to the distinction between the first and second experiments,
as the authors acknowledge (220). Why would Kant deal with natural
religion at such length in a Piece that concerns only the second experiment? An even greater problem is that they never convey what Kant
presents as the main purpose of his “turn” to the distinction between
natural and revealed religion in the Fourth Piece. His purpose is not (as
IDKR claims) to begin conducting his second experiment, having finally
completed the first. Rather, his aim (Religion, 182; see also 105; cf. KCR,
175–183) is to answer the question: How does God want to be served in a
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church? Answering this question is as crucial to the first experiment as to
the second. Is that why IDKR never calls attention to Kant’s explicit aim?
Acknowledging Kant’s focus would have required the authors to revise
their view of the second experiment’s location, abandoning one of their
three novel assumptions.
Is the “much-debated distinction” (211) between true and false service
to be identified solely with Kant’s second experiment? IDKR repeatedly
identifies the second experiment with the entire Fourth Piece, yet admits
the turn to the second experiment actually occurs only after Kant makes
this distinction in the introductory section. Ironically, IDKR’s discussion
of the second experiment does not begin until the second section of Chapter 8. What then is the status of Kant’s preliminary distinction, as put
forward in the introductory section (and in the Piece title)? Is it, or is it
not, part of his defense of the first experiment’s transcendental system of
religion? If it is, then the Fourth Piece does contain arguments essential to
the first experiment.
This second line of questioning can be summed up with a twofold
question: How can the authors reconcile their interpretation of the two experiments with the fact that Kant (a) establishes a crucial aspect of his system of rational religion in the Fourth Piece, and (b) considers how Christianity fits the mold
of rational religion in each of the four Pieces, especially in the final major section
of each Piece? This question is intensified when we note that IDKR says
almost nothing about the General Comments appended to each Piece. Its
account of the two experiments thus raises a further question: In what
way do the first three General Comments (dealing with Effects of Grace,
Miracles, and Mysteries) relate solely to the first experiment, while the
fourth General Comment (dealing with Means of Grace) relates solely to
the second experiment? Without a persuasive answer, we are left with
no other alternative than to conclude that IDKR inadvertently commits
the very error it accuses all past interpreters of committing: making their
position appear more persuasive than it actually is by truncating Kant’s
text wherever conflicting evidence arises.
IDKR’s Problem-Driven Hermeneutic
IDKR’s exegesis of Religion is driven by “conundrums” presented in the
writings of several critics. In itself, this is a legitimate expository strategy,
but it can produce only limited results: demonstrating that the conundrums can be solved. A good example of the impact of this problemdriven hermeneutic comes when the authors discuss the General Comment to the Fourth Piece. They mention this intriguing climax of Kant’s
text only in passing, saying they need not discuss the issues because it “is
not considered a source of conundrums” (228). However, these issues are
a source of significant misunderstandings (see KCR, 147–148, 472–497): reductionist interpreters frequently refer to this closing section of Religion
as evidence that Kant merely discards empirical religion. Any serious
affirmative interpreter must therefore stake a claim on these points of
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dispute: Is Kant affirming the value of prayer, or denying it? Is he encouraging church attendance, or providing a good excuse to stay away? Is he
disclosing the reason baptism and communion should be preserved, or
mocking those who still believe in silly rituals? IDKR offers no hint regarding how such important questions should be answered. If anything,
by referring to them as “excesses” (228), the authors imply they read Kant
as rejecting these elements of what Kant calls indirect service. If so, they
have (inadvertently?) portrayed Religion as reducing religion to morality
after all!
The dangers of IDKR’s way of interpreting Kant’s two experiments
are significant, at least for Christians: its portrayal of Kant’s second
experiment requires the authors systematically to overlook Kant’s many
attempts to reform traditional understandings of Christian doctrine and
practice. The First Piece no longer reveals a moral gap to be filled by scriptural symbols if (as IDKR argues) evil is a fully cognized, Aristotelian
reality whose depths are laid bare by Kant’s transcendental analysis
(e.g., 147–151). IDKR’s attempt to dissociate the Second Piece from Kant’s
second experiment likewise leads the authors to write as if Kant’s language is Platonic rather than Christian (158), even though Kant there
quotes frequently from the Bible. And in discussing the Third Piece
they read Religion 93–94 as claiming unconverted persons can corrupt the
disposition of good-hearted persons, when Kant’s argument makes sense
only if it refers to converted persons corrupting each other;14 with similar
implausibility, their novel assumption leads them to skew passages in the
Third Piece, where Kant refers explicitly to Christianity, as if his warnings about the dangers of organized religion refer only to “non-Christian
faiths” (e.g., 158).
Just as the authors’ assumption about the location of the two experiments adversely influences their understanding of how the first three
Pieces of Religion relate to historical faiths such as Christianity, it also
obscures various key factors relating to the role played by the Fourth
Piece in a rational system of religion. Thus, after reading an alleged “elitist tendency” into the Fourth Piece, their attempt to clear Kant from this
allegation (202) seems half-hearted. Yet Kant’s rejection of clericalism in
Religion is anti-elitist in the extreme. Unlike his later Conflict of the Faculties,
where his discussion of the conflict between religious and philosophical
scholars in a university has arguably elitist overtones, Kant’s arguments in
Religion are about how to please God in a church. By reading the assumptions
of Conflict back into Religion, IDKR makes the potential problem of elitism
look more important than the text merits.
The upshot is that, unless the authors can demonstrate the advantages
of their problem-driven hermeneutic in general and of their assumption
14
IDKR, 183 and passim; but cf. KCR, 167–168 and my article, “Kant’s Religious Argument for the Existence of God—The Ultimate Dependence of Human Destiny on Divine
Assistance,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009), 3–22.
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regarding the two experiments in particular, and can effectively rebut the
weighty evidence that militates against the latter, IDKR presents the ironic
picture of two “defenders” of Kant who, in trying to make his claims “coherent,” end up portraying Religion in a manner that renders his position
unworthy of assent, at least for Christians. Were Kant himself able to respond, I suspect he might refuse to address any of the foregoing issues,
instead merely reciting the old rabbinic prayer: “Lord, protect me from my
friends; I can take care of my enemies myself!”15
Hong Kong Baptist University

15
I comment more generally on IDKR in an invited book review published in The Journal of Religion 90:2, 49–52. The original version of the present essay, as it was written for
presentation at the AAR symposium (which, including footnotes, was well over twice the
length of its present incarnation) can be found at: hkbu.academia.edu/StephenPalmquist/
Papers/1387435/Cross-Examination_of_IDKR_at_AAR. Due to other pressing commitments, I was unable to attend that American Academy of Religion conferene (Montreal,
November 2009). Fortunately, Brandon Love, an Exchange Graduate Student working
with me in Hong Kong at that time, kindly offered to deliver it on my behalf. This was
appropriate, not only because Firestone had been the supervisor of Love’s Master Thesis
(2008–2009), but also because his thesis focused on the very issue I have highlighted in
the third section of this essay. See Brandon Love, “The Interpretation and Implications
of Kant’s Two Experiments in Religion” (Trinity International University MA thesis).
Love briefly surveys the views on the two experiments put forward by Wood, Michalson,
Reardon, Hare, Collins, Caird, and Despland; he then goes into much greater depth to examine the positions of KCR (pp. 59–91 and IDKR (pp. 83–99) on this topic, before comparing and contrasting the latter and proposing his new position. I would therefore like to
thank Brandon for passing on an earlier version of this paper on my behalf at the American
Academy of Religion conference held in Montreal (November, 2009) and for passing on
feedback from various persons attending the symposium; Andrew Chignell and an anonymous reviewer for some helpful suggestions; and most of all, the authors, for many years
of fruitful collaboration during which we have proved the validity of the maxim, opposition
is true friendship.

